The Smallville Effect: Social Ties Make Mobile Networks More Secure
  Against the Node Capture Attack by Conti, Mauro et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
91
2.
21
99
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
1 D
ec
 20
09
The Smallville Effect: Social Ties Make Mobile Networks
More Secure Against the Node Capture Attack
Mauro Conti ∗
Department of Computer Science
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
1081 HV - Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
mconti@few.vu.nl
Roberto Di Pietro†
UNESCO Chair in Data Privacy
Universitat Rovira i Virgili
43700 - Tarragona, Spain
roberto.dipietro@urv.cat
Andrea Gabrielli,
Luigi V. Mancini,
and Alessandro Mei
Dipartimento di Informatica
Universita` di Roma “Sapienza”
00198 - Roma, Italy
{a.gabrielli, mancini,
mei}@di.uniroma1.it
Abstract
Mobile Ad Hoc networks, due to the unattended nature of
the network itself and the dispersed location of nodes, are
subject to several unique security issues. One of the most
vexed security threat is node capture. A few solutions have
already been proposed to address this problem; however,
those solutions are either centralized or focused on theoret-
ical mobility models alone. In the former case the solution
does not fit well the distributed nature of the network while,
in the latter case, the quality of the solutions obtained for
realistic mobility models severely differs from the results ob-
tained for theoretical models. The rationale of this paper
is inspired by the observation that re-encounters of mobile
nodes do elicit a form of social ties. Leveraging these ties,
it is possible to design efficient and distributed algorithms
that, with a moderated degree of node cooperation, enforce
the emergent property of node capture detection. In partic-
ular, in this paper we provide a proof of concept proposing
a set of algorithms that leverage, to different extent, node
mobility and node cooperation—that is, identifying social
ties—to thwart node capture attack. In particular, we test
these algorithms on a realistic mobility scenario. Extensive
simulations show the quality of the proposed solutions and,
more important, the viability of the proposed approach.
1 Introduction
Ad Hoc networks are an ideal candidate for the deploy-
ment in harsh environments, due to their capacity of operat-
ing without an existing infrastructure. The application sce-
narios include law enforcement, search-and-rescue, disaster
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recovery, and others. In these cases, Ad Hoc Networks have
the additional appealing feature to be able to operate in an
unattended manner. However, this comes at a cost: Ad Hoc
networks are vulnerable to different kinds of novel attacks.
For instance, an adversary could eavesdrop all the network
communications, or it might capture (i.e. remove) nodes
from the network. Captured nodes can be re-programmed
and re-deployed in the network area, with the goal of sub-
verting the data aggregation, the decision making process,
or other operations. Moreover, they can be re-programmed,
replicated in many copies, and re-deployed in the network
to perform any sort of vicious attack, amplified by the pres-
ence of many malicious devices. In this paper, we start from
the observation that all of these attacks start from the cap-
ture of one of the nodes. Therefore, being able to detect this
malicious activity becomes a formidable way to stop many
of the threats to Ad Hoc networks.
The node capture attack may also be of independent in-
terest, an example comes from the LANdroids [20] research
program by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA). This research program has the goal of
developing smart robotic radio relay nodes for battlefield
deployment. LANdroid mobile nodes are supposed to be
deployed in a hostile environment, establish an ad-hoc net-
work, and provide connectivity as well as valuable informa-
tion for soldiers that would later approach the deployment
area. An adversary might attempt to capture one of these
nodes to reduce the efficiency of the network.
The unique requirements of the Ad Hoc network context
call for efficient and distributed solutions to the node cap-
ture attack. We believe that any solution to this problem
has to satisfy the following requirements: (i) to detect the
node capture as early as possible; (ii) to have a low rate of
false positives—nodes that are believed to be captured and
thus subject to a revocation process, but that were not actu-
ally taken by the adversary; (iii) to have a low rate of false
negatives–nodes that are believed to be not captured, but
2that were actually captured; (iv) to introduce a small over-
head. The solutions proposed so far are not efficient [25].
Moreover, naı¨ve centralized solutions, although they can in
principle be applied, present drawbacks like single point of
failure and non uniform energy consumption.
In this paper we tackle the problem of detecting the node
capture attack in the context of mobile Ad Hoc networks
of devices like smart-phone or PDAs carried by individuals.
These networks have attracted the attention of a large num-
ber of researchers in the field of networking. They are often
called Pocket Switched Networks, and they are part of the
class of the Delay Tolerant Networks. In Pocket Switched
Networks the contacts between devices are used as oppor-
tunities of message forwarding. Actually, a large part of the
work in this field has the goal of designing multi-hop rout-
ing mechanisms that are able to deliver messages between
any arbitrary pair of devices in the network efficiently. In
these networks the mobility pattern has some unique fea-
tures. Since devices are carried by humans, the pattern of
contacts between devices mimic the social nature of human
mobility. This observation has been used to build forward-
ing mechanisms that use the notion of community to make
messages find their way from source to destination.
In particular, this paper describes how to make use of the so-
cial nature of contacts to get a network stronger against the
node capture attack. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that demonstrates that social-based mobility has a
strong impact on security. In our solution, nodes are respon-
sible, in a distributed fashion, to monitor the presence of one
or more other peers. If the mobility pattern were irregular,
or arbitrary, or if every node moved independently, like in
the random way-point mobility model, then any choice of
pairs of monitoring and monitored node would essentially
be the same. Our key observation is that social mobility has
a unique pattern, and so there is a way to assign responsibil-
ities in the network to improve considerably the efficiency
of our protocols for the node capture attack. Quite natu-
rally, we will see that the the best performance is achieved
when the monitoring node and the monitored node have a
strong social tie. Just like in the real life, if we disappear for
some time the first persons that get worried are our family
members and our friends at work. Or just like what hap-
pens in small villages, where social ties are traditionally
very strong and where, if something wrong happens, very
quickly someone realizes and alert everybody. This is why
we call this phenomenon the Smallville effect.
We will describe the problem in terms of capture and
revocation of captured nodes. However, our solution can
be applied also in more general scenarios. As an exam-
ple, there could be a trust relationship established between a
group of users such that they stop trusting nodes that disap-
pear from the network for a given time-interval. The node,
in case its absence was not due to a capture, could be asked
to go through some expensive and secure procedure (e.g.
obtaining a new communication key form a central server)
in order to join again the group in the trust-relationship.
We will validate our solution with a large set of experi-
ments performed using real traces publicly available, those
collected at INFOCOM 2005, and we will see that the Smal-
lville effect can be considerably strong.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2 we review the related work in the area. In Section 3 we
present the system model and the assumption used in this
work. Our proposal is presented in Section 4, while the per-
formances results are discussed in Section 5. We conclude
the work in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Wireless social community networks are emerging as an
alternative to traditional networks to provide wireless data
services. This type of networks relies on users—a wire-
less community can rapidly deploy a high-quality data ac-
cess infrastructure in an inexpensive way. To the best of
our knowledge, no security issues have been investigated in
the particular context of social wireless communities net-
works. Interest in wireless social communities network has
been recently shown by the research community from dif-
ferent point of views, like network coverage [23] or the de-
tection of the source-starvation [15]. Also the identification
of communities in more traditional network, such as the file
sharing peer-to-peer network, has been of interest for the
research community [19].
Mobility as a means to enforce security in mobile net-
works has been considered in [3]. In [21], the authors iden-
tified social and situational factors which impact group for-
mation for wireless group key establishment. Further, mo-
bility has been considered in the context of routing [13] and
of network property optimization [22]. In particular, [13]
leverages node mobility in order to disseminate informa-
tion about destination location without incurring any com-
munication overhead. In [22] the sink mobility is used to
optimize the energy consumption of the whole network. A
mobility-based solution for detecting the sybil attack has
been recently presented in [26]. Finally, note that a few so-
lutions exist for node failure detection in ad hoc networks
[11,12,14,27]. However, such solutions assume a static net-
work, missing a fundamental component of our scenario, as
shown in the following.
Node capture attack is considered as major threat in
many security solutions for WSN. In particular, in [16] both
oblivious and smart node capture is considered for the de-
sign of a key management scheme for WSN. A deeper anal-
ysis on the modeling of the capture attack has been pre-
sented in [32, 33]. In [32], it is shown how different greedy
heuristics can be developed for node capture attacks and
how minimum cost node capture attacks can be prevented
in particular setting. In [33], the authors formalize node
capture attacks using the vulnerability metric as a nonlinear
integer programming minimization problem.
Node mobility and node cooperation in a mobile ad hoc
setting has been considered already in Disruption Tolerant
3Networks (DTNs) [9,30]. However, such a message passing
paradigm has not been used, so far, to support security. We
leverage the concept introduced with DTN to cooperatively
control the presence of a network node.
In [7, 8] a proof of concept that it is possible to design a
node capture detection protocol leveraging the network mo-
bility is given—more specifically leveraging the expected
“re-meeting” time between nodes. However, [7, 8] present
capture detection solutions focusing on a specific mobility
model, the Random Waypoint Mobility (RWM) model [2].
RWM shown different problems. One of these is that the
average speed of the network tends to decrease during the
life of the network itself and, if the minimum speed that
can be selected by the nodes is zero, then average speed of
the system converges to zero [36]. In [36] it is also sug-
gested to set the minimum speed to a value strictly greater
than zero. In this case, the average speed of the system con-
tinue decreasing, but it converges to a non-zero asymptotic
value. Other problems related to spatial node distribution
have been considered by different authors [18, 28, 36]. Fi-
nally, the RWM model can be far from describing realistic
mobility patterns [6, 18, 36]. The work in [6] highlighting
that in realistic mobility:
1. Some single nodes meet all the other nodes with a very
low frequency. In the following we will refer to such a
type of node as to isolated nodes.
2. There are subset of nodes that meet between them with
a significantly higher frequency than the average. We
will refer to such a type of subset as to communities.
As examples of everyday life, we can think to students
that attend the same class or people that work or live
in the same building.
In this work we do not consider mobility traces synthe-
sized using the RWM model. Instead, we consider only
real traces. Among the publicly available traces for mobile
nodes (e.g. from [1]), we consider the traces collected at IN-
FOCOM 2005 conference [29], already used in previous re-
search works [4,5,17,34]. In particular, the traces of mobile
nodes were gathered using Bluetooth devices distributed to
41 people attending the INFOCOM 2005 conference.
3 System Model and Assumptions
In the following we state all the assumptions used
throughout this paper as well as the overhead model used
to assess the performance of the proposal.
First, we clearly state the threat we are going to address.
Definition 3.1 Node Capture. An adversary physically re-
moves a node from the network—or just tamper with the
node—in a way such that the node can not communicate
with the other nodes in the network. The attack can last
forever or just for a given period of time.
Table 1 resumes the notation used in this paper.
Network assumptions We assume that the system pro-
vides a broadcasting primitive. This primitive is easily im-
plementable by using a flooding mechanism. Further, we
assume that nodes in the systems have a protocol abiding
behavior, and that no compromised node is present when
the protocol starts—indeed, node capture is a pre-requisite
for node compromise.
Moreover, in the proposed solution every node maintains
its own clock. To embrace the more general case, we also
assume that nodes are not equipped with localization de-
vices, like GPS. However, we require that clocks among
nodes are loosely synchronized. Note that there are a few
solutions proposed in the literature to provide loose time
synchronization, like [31]. Therefore, in the following we
will assume that skew and drift errors are negligible. Fi-
nally, security of network communications is out of the
scope of this work; however, note that in order to enforce
required security properties, we could rely on one of the
many protocols proposed in the literature. For instance, the
solution in [10] could be used to provide node authentica-
tion.
Message overhead model The main overhead intro-
duced by the protocol due to message broadcast. In [35]
a classification of the different solutions for broadcasting
scheme is provided: (i) Simple Flooding; (ii) probabilistic-
based schemes; (iii) area based schemes that assume loca-
tion awareness; (iv) neighbor knowledge schemes that as-
sume knowledge of two hop neighborhood. Analyzing or
comparing broadcasting cost is out of the scope of this pa-
per. However, for a better comparison of the solutions pro-
posed in this paper, we need to set a broadcast cost that
will be expressed in terms of unicast messages. In fact,
the overhead associated to the broadcasting varies with dif-
ferent network parameters (for instance, node density and
communication radius). A deeper analysis on the overhead
generated for different broadcasting protocols is presented
in [24].
Finally, note that a message could be received more than
once, for instance because the receiver is in the transmission
range of different rely nodes. However, in the following we
assume that a broadcasted message reaching all the nodes is
received (then counted) only once for each node—it costs
as 1 sent and 1 received message for each node. A similar
assumption is used for example in [24].
4 The Protocol
In this section, we present our solution. In particular, to
help the reader capture the insights of our final proposal,
we refer to the case where just one node is captured and
describe in the following two reference solutions:
• Benchmark protocol. The benchmark protocol is a
simple solution that does not use node mobility and
4Table 1. Time-related notation
Symbol Meaning
σ Message propagation delay.
τ Interval time between presence claim
for the Benchmark protocol.
λ Alarm time-out.
δ Time available to the allegedly captured node
to prove its presence.
γ Interval time for node cooperation requests
in the AdaBo protocol.
n Number of nodes in the network.
K Total number of nodes tracked by each node
KA Number of nodes tracked by each node
using adaptiveness.
KB Number of nodes tracked by each node
using booking.
contact patterns [8]. We briefly report this solution in
Section 4.1.
• Base protocol. Similarly, the base protocol introduced
in [7, 8] is briefly recalled in Section 4.2.
We use both the Benchmark and the Base protocol as
simple reference protocols to compare with. After these
simple solutions, we present other two protocols, each of
them capturing different aspects of the realistic mobility
model introduced:
• Booking protocol. This protocol addresses the isolated
nodes that can result in realistic mobile environments.
It is described in Section 4.3.
• Adaptive protocol. This protocol leverages the com-
munities that naturally emerge in realistic mobile envi-
ronments. It is described in Section 4.4.
Finally, we combine the two previous protocols as build-
ing blocks of our final proposal, the AdaBo protocol.
4.1 Benchmark Protocol
In this section, we report a naı¨ve solution for the node
capture detection that does not make use of node mobility.
First, assume that a Base Station is present in the network—
we will show later how to remove this assumption. Each
node periodically (for instance, every τ seconds) sends a
message to the BS carrying some evidence of its own pres-
ence. In this way, the base station can check whether a node
is present. If a node does not send the claim of its presence
to the BS when it is assumed to do that (after t seconds from
the previous claim), the base station will revoke the corre-
sponding node ID from the network (for instance, flooding
the network with a revocation message).
To remove the centralization point given by the presence
of the BS, we require each node to notify its presence to any
other node in the network (instead of just to the BS). A node
can prove its presence throughout a broadcasted and flooded
message. A node receiving this claim would restart a time-
out set to τ+σ, where σ accounts for network propagation
delay. Should the presence claim not be received before the
time-out elapses, the revocation procedure would be trig-
gered. However, note that if a node is required to store the
ID of any other node as well as the receiving time of the
received claim message, O(n) memory locations would be
needed in every node. To reduce the memory requirement
on node, it is possible to assume that the presence in the net-
work of each node is tracked by a small subset of the nodes
of the network. Hence, if a node is absent from the network
for more than τ seconds, its absence can still be detected by
a set of nodes.
Note that for the Benchmark protocol the average num-
ber of messages m(tu) each node sends (the equation actu-
ally holds also for the number of received messages) over a
time unit tu obeys to the following equation:
m(tu) =
tu
τ
·n (1)
where n is the number of nodes, and τ is the time-interval
between presence floodings sent by a single node. Assum-
ing a smart attacker that captures the node a just after the
presence claim flooded by node a, τ also corresponds to the
detection time.
4.2 Base Protocol
In this section, we report a recent protocol [7,8] designed
for the RWM model [2]. In the present work, we refer to
this previous proposal as the base protocol. The approach
in [7,8] is based on the following observation. First, if node
a has eavesdropped a transmission originated by node b, at
time t, we will say that a meeting occurred. Now, nodes
a and b are mobile, so they will leave the communication
range of each other after some time. However, these two
nodes are expected to re-meet again within a certain time-
interval, or at least with a certain probability within a certain
time-interval.
In the Base protocol, each node a is given the task of wit-
nessing for the presence of a specific set Ta of other nodes
(we will say that a is tracking nodes in Ta). In particular,
the node a selects the nodes to be in Ta as the first K nodes
a meets (where K is the desired cardinality of Ta). For each
node b ∈ Ta that a gets into the communication range of, a
sets the corresponding meeting time to the value of its inter-
nal clock and starts the corresponding time-out, that would
expire after λ seconds. As a protocol option, the meeting
nodes can also cooperate, exchanging information on the
meeting time of nodes of interests—that is, nodes that are
tracked by both a and b. If the time-out expires (that is,
a and b did not re-meet within λ seconds), the network is
flooded with a node-missing alarm triggered by node a. If
node b does not prove its presence within δ seconds after
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Figure 1. INFOCOM traces: Nodes meetings
the broadcasted node-missing alarm is flooded, every node
in the network will revoke node b.
4.3 Booking Protocol
In this section, we address the first characterization of
realistic mobility model. That is, there are some isolated
nodes that meet all the other nodes with a very low fre-
quency (compared to the meeting frequency the other nodes
have). In particular, an isolated node can appear for the first
time in the network (i.e. having the first meeting with an-
other node) a while after the network operations are started.
Observe that, if such a node is captured before the first
meeting, there would be no node tracking it (hence its cap-
ture would go undetected), for the Base protocol. An evi-
dence of the presence of isolated nodes can be seen in Fig-
ure 1. In fact, Figure 1 shows for each node (INFOCOM
traces) on the x-axis, the number of meetings for that node,
on the y-axis. From Figure 1 it is possible to note how node
13, as well as node 18, can be considered as isolated nodes.
Leveraging this observation, we introduce the Booking
protocol. Actually, this protocol is just a slightly modifi-
cation of the Base protocol. In particular, the only differ-
ence is in the way the K nodes that a node is going to track
are selected. In particular, we assume that the network ad-
ministrator decides for every node what are the IDs of the
other nodes it is going to track. In this way, the network
administrator can guarantee that every node is tracked by
a fixed number of other nodes. The Booking protocol not
only guarantees that every node is going to be tracked by
someone (property not satisfied by the Base protocol); it is
also possible for a node a to revoke a node b that it never
meets (e.g. b could had been captured at the network de-
ployment time or before the node a met it for the first time).
We observe that in the Booking protocol communities
are not leveraged to optimize the node tracking.
4.4 Adaptive Protocol
In realistic mobility pattern, it has been observed [6] that
there are subsets of nodes which elements meet between
them with higher frequency than the average (here, commu-
nities emerge).
Differently from the base protocol, that has been de-
signed for the RWM model, we can actually leverage this
behavior in the design of the capture detection protocol for
a realistic mobile environment. In fact, we expect that the
capture detection protocol would have better performances
if we were able to let the nodes track the other nodes that
they meet with higher frequencies, instead of just any K
out of the N nodes. In general, this improvement can
lead to a more efficient protocol (lower number of node-
missing alarm) or to a more effective protocol (lower detec-
tion time).
As the communities cannot be always predicted (e.g.
by the network administrator), we would also like that the
nodes autonomously discover who are the nodes that they
meet with higher frequency. Furthermore, a nice property
of the protocol would be for the node to adapt its set of
tracked nodes in the case that the mobility pattern changes.
With all these observations as a rationale, we design the
Adaptive protocol. The aim of this protocol is that while
the time goes by, the K nodes that a node is tracking are the
K better nodes for it to be tracked, i.e. out of the N nodes,
the K nodes for which it does not raise node-missing alarm.
The behaviour of the Adaptive protocol can be summarized
as follow:
• Node a starts tracking the first K nodes it meets (the
first selection of the tracked nodes is as for the Base
protocol).
• When a raises a node-missing alarm for a node, say
b, while b actually proves it presence, a stops tracking
node b and start tracking the next node it meets.
As an enhancement to this protocol, we let the nodes using
some memory slots to silently track nodes. We will refer
to such type of slots as Silent Memory Slots (SMSs). In
particular, a node a uses these slots as follows:
• The SMSs are populated as for the regular tracking
slot, considering the IDs of the first nodes that a meets.
• For each node in the SMSs, node a keeps note of the
number of meetings (normalized for a time unit). In
the following, we refer to such statistical value as the
score.
• When node a raises a node-missing alarm for a node,
say b, that actually proves its presence, the next node
to be tracked is not chosen as the first newly encoun-
tered node. Instead, the next node to be tracked is the
first in the SMSs list. Note that we consider the SMSs
list ordered based on the scores. In this way, node a
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Figure 2. AdaBo protocol: booking token ex-
change proposal.
will track the nodes that it met with higher frequency;
intuitively, the best one to be tracked among the nodes
a has in the SMSs.
• At regular time-intervals (a protocol parameter), a re-
moves from its SMSs the node with the lower score,
and put-in the next node it meets.
4.5 The AdaBo Protocol
On one hand, the Booking protocol aims to guarantee
that all the nodes (including the isolated ones) are tracked.
However, its efficiency could be questionable. On the other
hand, the Adaptive protocol aims to let each node be ef-
ficiently tracked while not giving the guarantee provided
by the Booking protocol. In this section, we describe the
AdaBo protocol that gives the guarantee of the Booking
protocol—i.e. that all the nodes are tracked—while being
quite efficient. Further, optimization are also introduced.
The simple idea we start from is to dedicate: (i) part
of the node’s memory slot to be managed according to the
Booking protocol; (ii) the remaining portion of the node’s
memory to managed according to the Adaptive protocol.
As for the number of memory slots to be dedicated to
the Booking protocol, we just observe that for each node a,
having one other node to track it is enough to guarantee that
every node is tracked by at least one node. Indeed, for any
captured node there will be a node detecting the capture and
raising the corresponding node-missing alarm. As a result,
we need that each node tracks in booking mode just one
other node to have the above property holding. For ease
of exposition, in the results presented in Section 5 we will
consider the AdaBo protocol where just one memory slot is
dedicated to the booking approach. In this section, we refer
to the example of Figure 2.
As pointed out in Section 4.3, the booking approach does
not leverage the communities. That is, it does not aim to ef-
ficiently assign the tracking of a node a, to the best node
that can track it—e.g. the node that meets a with higher fre-
quency. We further observed (Section 4.2) that for a node
a, tracking the first node that it meets, is a naı¨ve choice
to leverage communities. In the AdaBo protocol, we opti-
mize the way the booking part of the memory is used. In
particular, all the memory dedicated by the AdaBo to the
adaptive approach will be considered as SMSs. The infor-
mation about nodes in SMSs will be used to optimize the
booking part—allowing nodes to exchange the nodes they
are tracking in booking. AdaBo protocol can be described
as follows:
• Initialization. First, we let each node start having
in booking the token—i.e. the ID—of himself. Of
course, this is done just as a set-up choice. The node
will not actually track himself—there would be no util-
ity in doing it as the node should detect the capture of
himself. Furthermore, we assign to each node a max-
imum number of available token exchanges it can be
part of. When the protocol starts each node has not
participated in any exchange yet.
Each node uses all the memory dedicated to the adap-
tive approach in the silent mode (Section 4.4)—i.e.
just keeping note of the number of meeting over a time
unit for the nodes in this memory.
• Start-up. We give to the nodes a set-up time-interval
(that is a protocol parameter) during which the nodes
just collect statistics of the meetings with other nodes
(for the score in the SMSs). No node-missing alarms
are raised in this time-interval; no token exchanges are
made as well. As soon as the set-up time expires. Each
node will try to pass-it-on the token it holds (referred to
himself) to the node in the SMSs with higher score—
the node he met more frequently. The token exchanges
occurs based on node meeting and one-hop communi-
cation only. That is, in this case the exchange will be
done as soon as the node meets its first node in the
SMSs, c. Note that in this case the node’s aim is to be
tracked by some other node.
• Iterated step. After the first token exchange (previous
point), the node, say a, continues improving the qual-
ity of its tracking; that is, to track the best node it can
track, from the score point of view—let c be this node.
Note that, as a consequence of the previous exchanges,
this condition can not yet hold for all the nodes just af-
ter the first exchange. Furthermore, this condition can
also be unachievable for some node a: this happens ei-
ther if (i) a never meets the node that is having c in
booking; or, (ii) the node that is tracking c in booking
is not available for the token-exchange, accordingly
with the evaluation described in the following. Despite
this, the node a tries to reach its final (potential) target
(tracking the node with the highest score in its SMSs)
in a greedy way: as soon as it has the chance to im-
prove the quality of its tracking, a attempt to improve
it. For example, assume node a meets node d, that it is
currently tracking node c. Assume that a checks that
7it can track the node c with higher performance when
compared to the quality of the tracking of node b that is
currently booking (a checks that it is having with c an
higher number of meetings compared to the meetings
with b). In this case, node a proposes to the node d to
exchange the tokens—i.e. the IDs—of the nodes they
are respectively tracking in booking. Whether the ex-
change actually succeeds depends on node d. In partic-
ular, on whether node d will decrease the performance
over the booked node. To evaluate this, node d checks,
for the currently booked node c, its score value (if any;
a node in booking is not necessary also in the SMSs).
If a node proposed for the exchange (c or b) is not in
d’s SMSs, it is assigned score = −∞. Finally, node d
will agree for the exchange iff:
score(c)≥ score(b).
Note that, if node d does have neither c nor b in its
SMSs, the previous equation accounts for d helping a
improving its tracking performances. Finally, observe
that in any case an exchange happens, both exchanges
counter of a and d are incremented. Also, note that
if a node reached the maximum number of exchanges
it can participate in, it will not be able to propose ex-
changes.
In the AdaBo protocol we also consider an improvement
on the way a node sends the node-missing alarm. That is,
assume a time-out λ relative to node b is expiring on node
a. Node a, before flooding the network with a node-missing
alarm for b, will ask the nodes it meets in the last small time-
interval γ of λ, if they can prove him the presence of b within
the last λ time-interval. If the latter is the case, a will update
b’s presence with the time just proved to him. Otherwise,
as it happens for all the other presented protocols, a will
flood the network with a node-missing alarm relative to the
capture of node b.
We observe that for the described solution the following
problems could arise. If a node is captured while it has the
token of himself, no one will detect its capture. Such a prob-
lem could be solved by considering one more booking slot
(used only for the set-up time-interval) where IDs in book-
ing are assigned by the network administrator in such a way
that each node does not have its own token. After the set-up
time—i.e. after the nodes have given the token referred to
themselves to some other nodes—this second booking slot
can be used as SMSs.
A similar problem can also be found if we want to de-
ploy more nodes in subsequent times. A solution similar
to the one just described for the initial phase can be used.
In this case, an undesirable property will hold: the new set
of deployed nodes would be considered as an independent
network itself. That is, at the time of the new deployment,
a node belonging to the set of newly deployed nodes will
be tracked just by nodes from the same set. However, note
that as soon as the newly deployed nodes meet the previ-
ously deployed ones, the former ones will exchange tokens
with the latter ones, so removing the initial undesired prop-
erty. However, if a single alone node is deployed, we should
use some other mechanism; e.g. the BS could communicate
with a node already in the network to exchange the booking
token with the newcomer.
Finally, note that we described our solution privileging
ease of exposition. However, the proposed solution could
also address the problem of the changes in mobility pat-
terns. Such pattern mobility changes can be captured by
the proposed protocol re-running the start-up phase at reg-
ular time-interval. We leave as future work a detailed in-
vestigation of this issue, together with an assessment of the
efficiency of such mechanisms.
5 Simulations and Discussion
In this section, we present the results of the simulations
that we made in order to asses the performance of the pro-
posed solution. In particular, the main aim of the simulation
has been to investigate the protocol effectiveness (i.e. the
detection time) versus the protocol efficiency (i.e. the cost
in terms of messages). Furthermore, we also investigated
the false negative rate of the different protocols presented
in Section 4. We point out that our protocols do not have
false positives. In fact, assume that node a floods the net-
work with a node-missing alarm related to node b while b is
actually within the network—we assume in this case b can
communicate with the other network nodes. In our proto-
cols, b has δ seconds to prove its presence: δ accounts for
the propagation time of both (i) the node-missing message
sent by a; and, (ii) the presence proving message sent by b.
Hence, on the one hand, if node b can not be reached by the
flooded node-missing alarm it means b is isolated from the
other nodes: correctly considered as captured, indeed. On
the other hand, if it is reached by the node-missing alarm, it
can prove its presence—preventing false positives to occur.
We implemented a simulator of our protocols that takes
as input a trace of nodes mobility—every nodes meeting is
described by the couple of participating nodes ID and the
time of the meeting. We ran multiple simulations of the
protocols we proposed in Section 4. We used as an input
traces derived from the mobility traces collected at INFO-
COM 2005 [29]. We describe the traces in Section 5.1. The
setting of the simulation are described in Section 5.2. Fi-
nally, the simulation results are presented in Section 5.3.
5.1 Real Traces
The traces considered in our simulation have been ob-
tained from the mobility traces collected during the INFO-
COM 2005 Conference [29]. Information for the traces in
[29] has been gathered using Bluetooth devices distributed
to 41 people attending the conference. In particular, we
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are interested in the mobility and the social interaction be-
tween people during the daylight. Thus, we selected from
these traces the events within the 73,000th second and the
115,000th second. Then, we removed: (i) the events re-
lated to Bluetooth devices not explicitly involved in the ex-
periment (that are, devices not assigned by the experiment
organizer [29]); and, (ii) events related to devices involved
in the experiment but not reporting any meeting in the se-
lected time-interval (node with IDs 21 and 41). The re-
sulting traces have 39 nodes. To run extensively simula-
tion, we considered 10 times the subsequent repetition of
the obtained events. This choice is motivated by the fact
that nodes of social networks tend to repeat their mobility
pattern. The resulting traces consists of 420,000 seconds of
events. Finally, we assume that the events in the traces are
symmetric: if node a meets node b (that is node a knows
to be in the communication range of node b), then node b
meets a too. Observe that the resulting traces we used in
our simulation still maintain the characteristics of a social
network: it shows a power-law inter-meeting time.
5.2 Simulation Setting
We simulated different node captures, varying the cap-
tured node and the capture time. In particular, starting
from 100,000 seconds after the network deployment, we
have considered the events split in 13 intervals of 6 hours
each. For each of the 39 nodes in the traces, we simulated
the capture at the beginning of each of these intervals. In
other words, the first capture is simulated at 100,000 sec-
onds from the network deployment, and the last capture is
simulated at 359,200 seconds from the network deployment
(12 · 6 hours later). These resulting in a total of 507 simu-
lated captures for every combination of the protocol and λ
chosen. For every simulation, we run the protocol and mea-
sured the detection time and the number of messages sent
from the nodes in the network.
In the simulation results, we count the number of mes-
sages sent by the nodes when a node-missing alarm or a
presence-claim is broadcasted. Moreover, in the AdaBo
protocol we count the messages sent when two nodes ex-
change their tokens, and the messages sent when a node
asks for cooperation in the last small time-interval γ of λ
before sending a capture alarm. As we do not want that the
set-up phase influences the evaluation of the general cost of
the protocol (that in practice could last more that the simu-
lated time), we start measuring the performance of the pro-
tocols from the 84,000th second onwards. That is, the mes-
sages sent before the 84,000th second are not considered in
the final mean value of sent messages.
Note that we assume that a node becomes aware of the
nodes that are in its communication range, thanks to the
communication activity of the nodes, or thanks to the con-
trol messages of the network; as in the case of the INFO-
COM traces, the bluetooth protocol. Thus, we do not con-
sider the communication activity for the meeting event as
an overhead of the capture detection protocol.
As for the number of memory slots used by the proto-
cols, we considered a small value because we observed that
increasing the number of tracked nodes would just lead to
an higher protocol overhead while not improving the pro-
tocol performance in terms of detection. This characteriza-
tion is common for all the protocols we considered in this
work. Furthermore, we observe that using a small value
as for memory slots is particularly suitable for resource-
constrained devices like sensor network. In particular, we
used one slot for the tracked node, and 5 slots for the SMSs
of the Adaptive and AdaBo protocols.
In the simulation performed for the AdaBo protocol, the
nodes start exchanging their token after 42,000 seconds
from the network deployment. Furthermore, a node can
propose a token exchange with another node if its exchange
counter is not greater than 3. The time-interval γ during
which a node asks for cooperation before sending a node-
missing alarm is equal to 3,600 seconds.
5.3 Protocol Overall Performance
In Figure 3, we plot the results of the simulations: the
mean of the messages sent by each node per hour (y-axis)
for multiple resulting detection times (x-axis). Each point is
obtained as the mean of the results of 507 simulations exe-
cuted for each specific protocol and a fixed λ. In particular,
for each protocol we report the results for 6 different values
of λ: 12,600, 14,400, 16,200, 18,000, 19,800, and 23,400
seconds.
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Figure 3. INFOCOM traces: Cost vs. Detec-
tion
We observe that the Benchmark protocol has the worst
performance with respect to the other simulated protocols.
In fact, chosen a desired detection time, it required the
higher number of messages per hour. For example, given
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a detection time equals to 12,000 seconds, each node has to
send almost 12 messages per hour. Meanwhile, the other
protocols send about 5.2 messages per hour in the worst
case (i.e. the Booking protocol). Note that the protocols we
implemented, that are the AdaBo, the Adaptive, the Base,
and the Booking protocol, all leverage the meeting events
to detect a node capture. This confirms our intuition that
mobility and social ties can be leveraged to increase the per-
formance of the protocols used in the network.
A fair comparison between the AdaBo, the Adaptive, the
Base, and the Booking protocols can be made dividing these
protocols in two classes:
• first class. AdaBo and the Booking protocols.
• second class. Adaptive and the Base protocols.
The protocols in the first class guarantee that all the nodes
of the network are monitored. The protocols in the sec-
ond class do not guarantee that all the nodes of the network
are monitored. When a protocol of the first class is used,
we can always detect a node capture. While, when a pro-
tocol of the second class is used, it could be possible that
a node capture goes undetected. That is, a false negative
can occur. Because there is not a first class protocol that
has better performance than the ones in the second class,
there is not a protocol without false negative and with per-
formance better than the others. Thus, assuming that the
network administrator can not tolerate false negative detec-
tion, she has to adopt a protocol of the first class; otherwise,
she can use a protocol of the second class, depending on the
number of false negative the network can bear (discussed
later). From the results reported in Figure 3, we can ob-
serve that the property of the first class protocols, that is to
guarantee that all the nodes are tracked, comes at the prize
of more messages sent. In fact, the AdaBo and the Booking
protocols, on the contrary of the Adaptive and the Base pro-
tocol, monitor all the node in the network. Consequently,
they monitor also the isolated nodes, even if these isolated
nodes cause a high number of node-missing alarm.
In the Booking protocol, we assume that the network
administrator decides for every node what is the ID of the
other node it is going to track. In particular, in our simula-
tion the node with ID i monitors the node with ID i+1 mod-
ulo 39. Figure 3 also shows that between the two protocols
of the first class, the AdaBo has better performance than the
Booking one. We remind the reader that, the Booking pro-
tocol, differently from the AdaBo one, does not leverage the
communities to optimize the node tracking. The results sup-
port our thesis that the social characteristics of the networks
can be leveraged to increase the protocols performance.
Comparing the protocols of the second class, the Base
and the Adaptive ones, the Adaptive is better than the Base
protocol under two points of view. In the first place, from
the point of view of the performance. In fact, in Figure 3 we
can see that, fixed a capture detection time, in the Adaptive
protocol the number of messages sent per hour is lower than
the ones in the Base protocol. In the second place, from the
point of view of the false negative percentage. Indeed, from
our simulation results, we observed that the mean of the
false negative of the Base protocol over all the simulations
is about 43.6%, while the mean of the Adaptive protocol
is about 42.9%. Thus, the Adaptive protocol not only has
better performance respect to the Base one, but it has also a
lower percentage of false negative.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have showed that it is possible to lever-
age both node mobility and communities of nodes that nat-
urally emerge in mobile networks to enforce security prop-
erties. In particular, we have designed two class of proto-
cols that take into consideration realistic mobility models
to thwart node capture attack. The first class of protocols
provides the monitoring of the whole nodes in the network,
sacrificing some efficiency, while the second one releases
the control on isolated nodes, achieving efficiency gains.
The proposed protocols have been tested on real traces,
and the results confirmed our intuition: protocols leveraging
emergent social ties provide better performances than proto-
cols leveraging mobility only. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first result in the area and could open up a vein of
research aimed at combining mobility and emergent social
ties in mobile networks to enforce security properties.
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